The Epistemic Values in the Theory of Law: Antithesis to Legal Interpretivism or Proclamation of Legal Positivism?

Introduction. Traditionally, the problem of defining the foundations of legal values is studied within the framework of natural law interpretivism and formal epistemology. The epistemic approach asserts the degree of evidence, consistency and truthfulness of the studied concepts and worldviews. However, due to the substantive connection acknowledged between law and morality, there arises the problem of correlating the epistemic and axiological principles within the concept of legal values. The aim of the study is to develop a holistic understanding of epistemic legal values and determine their functional advantages in the legal practices.

Materials and Methods. The article presents a comparative analysis of the attitudes towards the concept of legal values from the point of view of natural-law and positivism. The provisions and arguments demonstrating practical applicability of both approaches were arranged and structured. The analysis of relevant scientific research made it possible to distinguish the hierarchical structure of the concept under study and its components.

Results. The original neutrality of a legal value has been ascertained. Systematization of the arguments in favour of the natural law approach makes it possible to explain the moral basis of the legal values. However, morality cannot be universally applicable due to sociocultural differences. Therefore, the theory of equal unity of axiological and epistemic values of law proves to be untenable. In the frame of legal realism, the theory of axiological values does not contradict the principles of positivism, on condition of adhering to the principle of the supremacy of law, which results in increased significance of the epistemic values aimed at ensuring the efficient legal practices (consistent and predictable), and eliminating bias and discrimination.

Discussion and Conclusion. The epistemic values that affirm the principle of legal objectivity are the functional core of any legal system, whereas an alternative thinking paradigm (the moralizing interpretation) can be considered only as a predictor of the methodological changes in social legal relationships. The definition of the notion of “epistemic legal values” developed by the authors contributes to the expansion of the analytical toolkit of modern science. The results of the study can be implemented into the process of epistemic modeling of legal practices.

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